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RECENT DECISIONS
Constitutional Right of
Confrontation Applied to States
In a Texas criminal prosecution, the
state introduced, over timely objection, a
transcript of testimony obtained at a pre-
liminary hearing. At that hearing, the de-
fendant, not represented by counsel, was
afforded an opportunity to personally
cross-examine the accusing witness, but
chose not to do so. Since the witness was
not present at the ensuing trial, the de-
fendant never had an opportunity to cross-
examine him with the aid of counsel. The
United States Supreme Court reversed the
defendant's conviction, holding that Texas
had violated the right of confrontation
guaranteed by the sixth amendment and
made applicable to the states by the four-
teenth amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380
U. S. 400 (1965).
The guarantee of an accused's right to
confront the witnesses against him is fun-
damental to Anglo-American jurispru-
dence.1 It has developed from the be-
1 Virtually all the states, by constitution or by
statute, and the federal constitution require that
defendant be allowed to confront the witnesses
against him. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1397 (3d
ed. 1940).
lief that when government threatens an
individual through legal action, the indi-
vidual must be afforded fair opportunity
to challenge the truth of the charge against
him.2 At common law, the essence of con-
frontation was the opportunity of the ac-
cused to cross-examine his accuser.3 Al-
though it was deemed highly desirable that
the judge and jury be able to observe the
demeanor of the witness, the right of per-
sonal confrontation was not absolute, and
was dispensed with in necessity.4  The
framers of the federal constitution chose to
expressly guarantee the right of confronta-
tion in the sixth amendment, not as an ab-
solute right, but with the qualifications in-
herent in the common-law rule.5 The states
generally guarantee at least common-law
2 Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959).
3 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1395-96 (3d ed.
1940). Id. §§ 1395-1418 is the classic statement
of the law of confrontation.
4 See 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1396, 1404 (3d
ed. 1940); see also Mattox v. United States, 156
U.S. 237, 242 (1895).
Mattox v. United States, supra note 4, at 243-
44. E.g., declarations from the deathbed are
universally admissible without cross-examination.
Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330
(1911).
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confrontation, some expressly requiring
more (usually the face-to-face meeting of
the accused and his accuser). 6 The uni-
versality of the confrontation-cross-ex-
amination privilege is the product of the
belief that direct and challenging question-
ing is the ultimate test of the value of hu-
man statements.
7
The Supreme Court has often indicated
that it considers the right of confrontation
an essential element of due process. It has
described confrontation in words reminis-
cent of the Palko v. Connecticut" test of
due process, viz., that it is inherent in the
concept of ordered liberty and essential for
fundamental fairness.9 In In re Oliver,'0
the Court, dealing with a contempt con-
viction for alleged false testimony, held
that due process requires the states to grant
the defendant a reasonable opportunity to
defend himself. By way of dicta, the Court
indicated that both confrontation--cross-
examination and representation by counsel
were essential parts of the due process
right of an accused to his day in court."
In the typical confrontation case, the Su-
preme Court has limited the issue to
whether or not due process has been vio-
lated, using only the fundamental fairness
standard. Although it had always indi-
cated that confrontation was fundamental,
until Pointer the Court had never held
6 See State ex rel. Gladden v. Lonergan, 201
Ore. 161, 269 P.2d 491 (1954).
7 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367 (3d ed. 1940).
The bias or falsity of the one-sided view of a
witness is most effectively exposed by an oppo-
nent vitally interested in the contrary result.
Greene v. McElroy, supra note 2, at 497.
8 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
9 See, e.g., Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466,
473 (1965); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273
(1948).
10 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
11 Id. at 273.
that confrontation was required by due
process.
The role of the attorney in relation to
this right has been unclear. All that com-
mon law seems to have required was an
opportunity for cross-examination by a
vitally interested opponent. 2 Although it
was recognized that in modern criminal
procedure, effective cross-examination
could be conducted only by a skilled attor-
ney,'1 apparently no formal rule requir-
ing assistance of counsel had developed. 14
In the landmark decision of Gideon v.
Wainwright, the Court held that by virtue
of our adversary system, no person in court
can be assured a fair trial unless counsel
is provided for him.' 5 Since the confronta-
tion--cross-examination of witnesses is a
major part of the attorney's work in crim-
inal trials, Gideon prepared the way for a
fuller consideration of the role of the at-
torney vis-a-vis confrontation.
In the instant case, Mr. Justice Black,
writing for the Court, noted that Gideon
had made the sixth amendment's right to
assistance of counsel obligatory upon the
states, and then declared that the amend-
ment's right of confrontation is likewise
a fundamental right, made applicable to
the states by virtue of the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause.16 There-
fore, the body of law advanced by the fed-
eral cases interpreting the sixth amend-
ment guarantee of confrontation is binding
upon the states. 17 Finally, the Court held
12 See 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367 (3d ed.
1940).
13Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344
(1963).
14 Pointer v. Texas, 375 S.W.2d 293, 295 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1963).
15 Supra note 13.
16 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
1 See id. at 406.
that the federal standard had been vio-
lated because the trial court had not af-
forded the defendant, through counsel, an
adequate opportunity to cross-examine his
accuser.' 8 In a concurring opinion, Mr.
Justice Harlan insisted that, since the due
process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment was sufficient ground for reversal, the
Court should not have resorted to incor-
poration of the federal standard of the
sixth amendment guarantee. 19
Since the Court had long regarded the
right of confrontation as fundamental, it
seems it was but a matter of time before
it would formally incorporate this sixth
amendment guarantee into the due process
requirement of the fourteenth amendment.
It is unusual, however, that it chose to
adopt the sixth amendment's guarantee it-
self, i.e., the federal standard in toto with
all the nuances of the old federal deci-
sions. 20 In this instance, the federal stand-
ard and that of the various states are virtu-
ally identical- both drawing heavily on
Wigmore's definitive exposition of the law
of confrontation. 21 Therefore, the principal
case will effect little change in the indi-
vidual's relation to the federal and state
governments. Of course, there will now be
a uniform confrontation standard, well-
developed and quite explicit, protecting in-
dividuals from federal and state action.
Further, the test of constitutionality will
subsequently correspond to the federal
case law; no longer will the states be sub-
's See id. at 407.
'9 Id. at 408. Justices Stewart and Goldberg also
concurred, Justice Goldberg offering his view as
to the incorporation controversy. Id. at 410.
20 E.g., Gideon guaranteed an indigent's right to
court-appointed counsel in a state court, but did
not adopt the standards previously applied to
indigents in federal courts.
21 See cases cited in notes 4, 5, 6, 9 supra.
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ject to the uncertain test of fundamental
fairness when questions of the denial of
the right of confrontation arise.
The principal case, considered in con-
junction with Malloy v. Hogan22 (which
held the federal standard of protection
from compelled self-incrimination ap-
plicable to the states) seems to indicate
the future incorporation of additional spe-
cific clauses of the bill of rights into the
due process guarantee against the states.
Such a result portends substantial changes
in the law in those areas where the fed-
eral standard is more highly developed or
more sensitive to the needs of protection
of individuals than the standards of the
various states.
As to the accused's right of counsel in
confrontation, the Court's holding in the
principal case might best be described as a
formal integration of the previous federal
law of confrontation 23 with the revolution-
ary holding of Gideon v. Wainwright.24
Certainly Gideon foreclosed any further
discussion of whether an attorney's aid at
a criminal trial is essential to due process.
The assistance of counsel is now formally
held to be essential to a constitutionally
valid cross-examination of an adverse wit-
ness.
Pointer will have a two-pronged effect
on pretrial criminal procedure. First, and
most obvious, is that if, at any preliminary
hearing, the district attorney secures state-
ments from witnesses who will not be pres-
ent at the trial, the statements will be in-
admissible unless the accused was allowed
full opportunity, through counsel, to cross-
examine these adverse witnesses at that
22 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
23 Pointer v. Texas, supra note 16, at 404-07.
24 Supra note 13.
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hearing. Secondly, and collaterally, the
principal case might strongly influence the
state's decision as to when it is necessary
to appoint counsel to defend an accused
indigent. The broad holding of Escobedo
v. Illinois25 (that the accused has a right
25 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964).
"Allen Charge" Used
in Absence of
Deadlocked Jury
Appellant was convicted of stealing from
the mails, forging and uttering Government
checks, and conspiring to commit the al-
leged acts. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, reversing in
part and affirming in part, held that the
supplemental charge given the jury after
their deliberation for approximately four
and one-half hours did not go beyond the
permissible "Allen charge,"' and there-
fore, did not constitute reversible error.
Walker v. United States, 342 F.2d 22
(5th Cir. 1965).
Whenever the jurors, at early common
law, were given the task of deliberating
upon the evidence and reaching a verdict,
they usually were not discharged until they
'Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
The charge permitted in Allen instructs the mi-
nority juror to examine the questions submitted
to him with a proper regard for the conclusion
of the majority; he need not, however, necessar-
ily acquiesce in that conclusion.
to counsel when the process shifts from
investigatory to accusatory) obviously
creates a constitutional right to counsel
long before the trial. Thus, to protect it-
self against unforeseen contingencies, the
state may be forced to provide counsel for
the indigent even before the constitution
requires it.
had reached a verdict.2 The purpose of
keeping a jury together was twofold: (1)
to keep the individual jurors free from im-
proper influences;3 and (2) to coerce
agreement among the jurors.' To assure
the success intended, the jurors were
placed in the charge of a sworn officer of
the court, without food, drink or fire (with
the exception of candlelight).5 If they did
not agree before the court adjourned, they
were carried around in a cart until a ver-
dict was "bounced out."'
In the United States, this common-law
practice was followed until 1851, when the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in
Commonwealth v. Tuey 7 upheld the fol-
lowing charge which was read to a jury,
after a reported deadlock:
2Shoukatallie v. R., 3 All E.R. 996, 1000
(1961).
3 McHenry v. United States, 276 Fed. 761, 763
(D.C. Cir. 1921).
4 Ibid.
5 Shoukatallie v. R., supra note 2; accord, Mc-
Henry v. United States, supra note 3.
631 U. CHI. L. REV. 386 (1964); accord, Mc-
Henry v. United States, supra note 3.
7 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 1 (1851).
